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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
I . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT GEORGE FISHER J R . MADE AN ORAL 
MODIFICATION OF THE ESCROW AGREEMENT WITH MAX FISHER, POSTPONING PAYMENTS 
DUE UNDER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT. 
P l a i n t i f f s s u g g e s t i n t h e i r r e s p o n s e b r i e f t h a t t h i s c o u r t 
s h o u l d a p p l y t h e s t a t u t e of f r a u d s t o o n l y t h e p o r t i o n s of t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s t h a t a r e no t a d v e r s e t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n . Tha t 
s u g g e s t i o n i s unfounded i n l aw. The s t a t u t e of f r a u d s a p p l i e s t o 
t h e p a r t i e s a l l e g e d o r a l ag reemen t a s a w h o l e . 
P l a i n t i f f s i n c o n s i s t e n t l y a r g u e t h a t t h e y do n o t w i sh t o 
d i s t u r b t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g of an o r a l m o d i f i c a t i o n b e c a u s e 
t h i s r u l i n g a v o i d s t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , b u t t h e n t h e y a s s e r t 
1 
Case No: 950089-CA 
Priority No. 15 
that the oral modification insofar as it applies to continued 
yearly payments is voided by the statute of frauds. See 
Plaintifffs# Reply Brief at 4 and 6. These two positions are 
irreconcilable. The statute of frauds applies to the entire oral 
modification or it does not apply at all. 
m Ziort's Properties", inc. v." Holt. 538 P. 2d 1319, 1322 ItTtah' 
1975) , the Utah Supreme Court addressed a case substantially 
identical to the one at bar. In Zion' s, plaintiffs contended that 
defendants had orally agreed to the modification of a contract for 
the purchase of real property to allow for a reduced payment until 
certain personal property was removed from the real property. This 
Court stated: 
It is elementary that when a contract is required to be in 
writing, the same requirement applies with equal force to any 
alteration or modification thereof. More importantly here, 
any such modifying agreement must be sufficiently certain and 
unequivocal in its terms that the parties will understand what 
it is and what is to be done under it. 
Id. (emphasis added.) Plaintiffs correctly note that under Utah 
law, the purchase of real property is a transaction that must 
satisfy the statute of frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. Therefore 
any agreement which purports to modify the original agreement must 
be in writing. 
In the case at bar, both plaintiffs and defendants agree that 
no documentation of the supposed modification exists. The trial 
court found that this modification was purely an oral agreement 
between Max and his father George. Therefore, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-1 and Zion's Properties, the trial court finding of an oral 
modification is clearly erroneous and must be overturned. 
2 
Besides the statute of fraud problems addressed in Zion's 
Properties, the court also ruled that any modifying agreement must 
be sufficiently "certain and unequivocal in its terms that the 
parties will understand what it is and what is to be done under 
it." 538 P.2d at 1322. As stated in Defendants' opening brief, 
the terms of- the supposed oral agreement do not rise to a "meeting* 
of the minds." Therefore, this Court should overturn the trial 
court's finding of an oral modification and allow Plaintiff's such 
recovery as they are legally entitled to under the original 
contract. 
I I . THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO APPLY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO 
THE MAJORITY OF YEARLY INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS UNDER THE ESCROW AGREEMENT WHEN 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PURSUE ACTION WITHIN THE S I X - Y E A R STATUTORY PERIOD. 
I n t h e i r r e p l y b r i e f , p l a i n t i f f s r a i s e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t w h i c h 
s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s s h o u l d b e a p p l i e d i n a n a c t i o n f o r 
f o r f e i t u r e . P l a i n t i f f s m i s c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e n a t u r e of t h i s c a u s e o f 
a c t i o n . A l t h o u g h t h e y a r e s e e k i n g f o r f e i t u r e , t h e b a s i s o f t h a t 
f o r f e i t u r e i s f a i l u r e t o p a y t h e l e g a l a m o u n t s owed u n d e r a w r i t t e n 
e s c r o w a g r e e m e n t . T h e r e f o r e , U t a h Code Ann . S e c t i o n 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 3 ( 2 ) 
a p p l i e s t o t h i s c a u s e o f a c t i o n . 1 
I n F r e d e r i c k s e n v . K n i g h t Land C o r p . , 667 P . 2 d 3 4 , 36 ( U t a h 
1 9 8 3 ) , t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t a d d r e s s e d w h i c h s t a t u t e o f 
l i m i t a t i o n s was a p p l i c a b l e t o a s i t u a t i o n s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r t o 
Although Sect ion 78-12-6 of the Utah Code Ann. Does apply to causes of 
ac t ion involving t i t l e to r ea l proper ty , t h i s sec t ion i s s p e c i f i c a l l y a p p l i c a b l e 
to cases such as adverse possess ion where the ac tua l t i t l e i s in d i s u p u t e . In 
t h i s case, the cause of ac t ion does not a r i s e because the t i t l e i s in d i spute but 
the ac t ion i s founded upon a wr i t t en escrow agreement. Therefore, sec t ion 7 8-12-
6 does not apply . 
3 
the one at bar. In Fredericksen. the plaintiffs sued under an 
installment contract for "conveyance of the property or, in the 
alternative, repayment of his $10,000." Id. at 35. The Court 
stated: 
The applicable statute of limitations provides that an action 
based on a written contract must be commenced within six years 
••after-the- cause of—action-ari-se^ ; 'See U.C'.A.-v, ^ 1953,' §§" 78-
12-1 & 23(2) . The statute of limitations begins to run at the 
moment that a cause of action arises. "Ordinarily, a cause of 
action for a debt begins to run when the debt is due and 
payable because at that time an action can be maintained to 
enforce it." O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 357, 463 
P.2d 799, 800 (1970). 
Id. (Cites omitted). 
Just as in Fredericksen this case is founded upon a written 
contract. Any rights the plaintiffs may have in regards to 
forfeiture, they receive under that written contract. Therefore, 
the proper statute of limitations is 78-12-23(2). 
Insofar as this statute affects Plaintiffs right to 
forfeiture, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that all statutes of 
limitation are 
predicated on the proposition that the prescribed period does 
not begin to run against a party until a cause of action has 
arisen. This does not occur in an action for possession of 
land until the right of possession has been so challenged as 
to give rise to a cause of action. 
Ash v. Utah. 572 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added.) 
Under this statement of law, this Court must decide when 
Plaintiffs' right to possession to the property in question became 
so challenged as to give rise to a cause of action. The first 
installment payment was due in May of 1975. The last payment would 
4 
have been due in May of 1992. Although there is dispute over the 
reason, all parties concur that no yearly payments were made.2 
Under the terms of the escrow agreement, Plaintiffs had the 
right to declare forfeiture immediately upon the first missed 
payment. They chose not to exercise that right and immediately 
rupon* tne-'dafce at?- the-*mrssed: -payment *tiie statute of limitations 
began to run. Six years after that missed payment Plaintiffs' 
rights to seek forfeiture for that missed payment and their rights 
to recover the actual dollar payment was barred by the statute of 
limitations. Subsequently, the statute of limitations began to run 
on Plaintiffs right to forfeit the property for failure to make a 
scheduled payment as each payment became due and was not made. 
Plaintiffs filed suit in June of 1993. Therefore, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) they may bring a forfeiture action only 
based upon defendants failure to pay since June of 1987. 
Furthermore, it is essential that this Court address the 
statute of limitations to decide the exact amount necessary to cure 
the alleged breach. Defendants' position is that they are legally 
obligated to pay $47,717.00, the amount not barred by the statute 
of limitations as argued in Defendants' opening brief. Plaintiffs 
have not disputed this amount other than to state that if they can 
bring a forfeiture action they have the right to recover all 
2This does not include the disputed payment made by Max and Joyce for the 
sale of cattle which took place in 1979. 
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amounts originally due under the escrow agreement.3 See 
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 23. Because of the dispute as to the 
exact amount necessary to cure the alleged breach of the escrow 
agreement, unless this Court addresses this issue, this case will 
be subject of continued extensive litigation. 
I l l ' ; " - JTHE- ••TRXSn- ^OUKT XMPROPSRIJY "ifJULED'-TO* 'APPLY THE' ".EQUITABLE ' DOCTRINES OT 
WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES IN THIS CASE WHEN GEORGE FISHER TOLD MAX AND 
JOYCE FISHER NOT TO MAKE THE YEARLY INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS AND MAX AND JOYCE 
ACTED IN RELIANCE UPON GEORGE ' s REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENTS FOR 
APPROXIMATELY 19 YEARS WITHOUT REPRISAL? 
A. Waiver 
P l a i n t i f f s ' statement that the s ta tus of the legal doctrine of 
waiver in Utah i s "confused" i s misguiding. Although the Supreme 
Court in Sotor ' s Inc.v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan, 857 P.2d 
93 5 (Utah 1993) does indica te tha t up to tha t time t h i s doctr ine 
had been "ambiguous," the Court 's purpose in answering the 
c e r t i f i e d questions from the federal court was to c l a r i f y the 
p r i n c i p l e of waiver. Once Sotor ' s had been decided, Utah had a 
very d e f i n i t i v e and c lear waiver provis ion. 
Under t h i s waiver doct r ine , the court must look to the 
t o t a l i t y of the circumstances to see if an in ten t iona l 
rel inquishment of a known r igh t was present . In Defendants' 
3 D e f e n d a n t s have been u n a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e how P l a i n t i f f s r e a c h e d t h e 
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t s i n c e t h e y have t h e r i g h t t o m a i n t a i n a f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n t h e y 
h a v e t h e r i g h t t o r e c o v e r t h e n e n t i r e amount due u n d e r t h e o r i g i n a l e s c r o w 
a g r e e m e n t . None of t h e c a s e s P l a i n t i f f s c i t e i n t h e i r b r i e f s u p p o r t such a 
c o n c l u s i o n , and t o so h o l d would be c o n t r a r y t o numerous c a s e s which h o l d t h a t 
t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s b e g i n s t o run i m m e d a i t e l y upon a m i s s e d i n s t a l l m e n t 
p a y m e n t . O ' H a i r v . K o u n a l i s , 463 P .2d 799, 800 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) ; F r e d r i c k s e n v . 
Knoah t Land Corp . , 667 P .2d 34, 36 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) ; Moab N a t . Bank v . K e y s t o n e -
W a l l a c e R e s o u r c e s , 517 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Utah 1973) . By a l l o w i n g f o r f e i t u r e which 
r e q u i r e s D e f e n d a n t s t o pay t h e e n t i r e amount u n d e r t h e n o t e , P l a i n t i f f s a r e 
e f f e c t i v e l y a b l e t o n u l l i f y t h e l e g a l e f f e c t of t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s which 
h a s r u n on t h e m i s s e d p a y m e n t s . 
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opening brief, they discussed at length the evidence presented 
which indicated that George Fisher intended to relinquish his right 
to payments as they became due. On numerous occasions he 
instructed Max and Joyce not to make the payments but to reinvest 
the money into the property. Although this does not manifest an 
intent to 'relinquish "Ge'drge1^ riglit^ra cblTect' "future payments/"it 
does clearly indicate that he intended for Max and Joyce to 
continue to reinvest the money until George requested payment. 
This action by George clearly indicates an intentional waiver of 
all payments until he informed Max and Joyce otherwise. 
Finally, LaRue Fisher never voiced a contrary opinion or 
command to Max and Joyce until after George's death, almost 
nineteen years after they missed the original payment. This 
longstanding inaction also indicates LaRue Fisher's intention to 
abide by the decisions of her husband on this matter which was to 
waive payments under the contract until they needed the money. 
B. Estoppel 
Plaintiffs' statute of frauds argument in connection to the 
legal doctrine of estoppel is at best confusing. Apparently they 
are trying to argue that the Utah Supreme Court case of Coombs v. 
Ouzounian, 465 P.2d 356 (Utah 1970), stands for the proposition 
that one party's actions cannot infer estoppel upon another under 
the statute of frauds. This interpretation of Coombs is completely 
erroneous. 
In Coombs, husband and wife had entered into an option 
agreement for the purchase of real property. When that option 
7 
agreement ended, the husband extended it without the consent of the 
wife. Later, when the purchaser of the property chose to exercise 
his option under the extended agreement, the wife objected, 
alleging that the statute of frauds prevented the purchaser from 
enforcing the option agreement which to she was not a party. The 
purchaser argued that the" wife Was dropped""'Tfbnr -asserting"-'tile' 
statute of frauds by reason of her failure to contact him and 
inform him that she would not honor the extension. The court 
found that the wife could not be estopped from asserting the 
statute of frauds. Id. at 358. 
Here, Defendants have asserted that LaRue Fisher's actions 
prevent her from collecting under the contract, not that they estop 
her from raising the statute of frauds. Indeed, both Plaintiffs 
and Defendants agree that the statute of frauds should be applied 
to the oral modification. This is completely opposite from the 
Coombs case where the purchaser was attempting to overcome a 
statute of frauds bar. 
At no point in their brief did Plaintiffs discuss the merits 
of Defendants' estoppel argument. Even if they argued that LaRue 
Fisher should not be estopped from asserting her rights under the 
escrow agreement because of her attitude, this is not sufficient to 
overcome an estoppel bar. 
Estoppel is based upon one party's actions or inaction which 
induces another to take a detrimental course of action. Blackhurst 
v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985). As 
previously stated in Defendants' first appellate brief, a party 
8 
seeking estoppel must demonstrate a statement, admission, act or 
failure to act by one party inconsistent with a later asserted 
claim. Cesco v. Concrete Specialist. Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah 
1989) . 
In the present case, even if LaRue Fisher disagreed with her 
misDand's actions in" dealing witn Wax and'^Jo^cc, S?i&'^remained 
silent for almost eighteen years. Under the terms of the escrow 
agreement, LaRue also had specific rights she could have enforced 
to assert her claims to the property. However, in the twenty years 
since this contract was signed, she never indicated to Max and 
Joyce that she did not approve of their arrangement with George 
until George's death. At that time, she finally asserted her 
claims under the escrow agreement. This type of inaction is 
exactly what the doctrine of estoppel was designed to prevent. 
C. Laches 
Plaintiffs admit that there was a lack of diligence on their 
part in asserting their rights under the escrow agreement. See 
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 19. Furthermore, they do not dispute 
that Max and Joyce will be injured by Plaintiffs' lack of 
diligence. 
Were they to dispute this issue, they would have the burden of 
marshaling the evidence to prove the trial court's finding that 
Defendants' would be greatly harmed by an order of forfeiture was 
in error. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1096 (Utah 1991); 
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989). As stated in 
Defendants' opening brief, Plaintiffs have failed to properly 
9 
marshall the evidence and demonstrate how the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion. Therefore, 
Defendants' argument on the laches defense remains unchallenged and 
this Court should apply this doctrine and dismiss Plaintiffs' 
claims. 
tr'. IN- FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT HAD BEEN MODIFIED , THE TRIAL' COURT ERRED BY 
CONCLUDING THAT INTEREST CONTINUED TO ACCRUE ON THE CONTRACT PRINCIPAL WHEN 
ALL THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT CONTINUED ACCRUAL WAS NEVER CONTEMPLATED 
BY THE PARTIES, GEORGE FISHER DID NOT EXPECT INTEREST TO ACCRUE AND THE 
PAYMENTS WERE WAIVED BY BOTH GEORGE AND LARUE FISHER. 
Plaintiffs' argue in their reply brief that because the 
original contract provided for interest at the rate of 5% per 
annum, this rate should continue to accrue until they have paid the 
entire balance under the escrow agreement. However, the trial 
court found that the original escrow agreement had been orally 
modified. Whether interest on the entire contract principal 
continues to accrue for an indefinite period, while payments are 
either deferred or waived at the behest of the seller is a crucial 
element to any alleged oral modification and in equity, should be 
addressed by the court. 
If the parties did orally modify the agreement, it would be 
inequitable to rule that in the absence of specific agreements 
regarding interest the original agreement's provisions would 
prevail. Indeed, as Defendants pointed out in their opening brief, 
the only evidence whether interest was contemplated by George 
Fisher indicated that he did not believe interest should continue 
to accrue. 
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Furthermore, this evidence also strongly suggests that George 
Fisher intended to waive interest under the escrow agreement. If 
this Court upholds the oral modification, it should find that 
George Fisher waived collection of interest and it would be 
inequitable to require Max and Joyce to pay accrued interest on the 
ori-g-irral- amount when -George -TFisherf s actions -induced thfcm to 
forestall payment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons stated in 
Defendant's opening brief, Defendants respectfully request that 
this Court deny Plaintiffs requested forfeiture and grant 
Defendants quieted title in the property. Alternatively, 
Defendants request that this Court apply the statute of limitations 
and uphold the trial court's ruling that forfeiture would be 
inequitable, and Defendants must pay amounts not barred by the 
statute of limitations to obtain clear title to the property. If 
this court upholds the trial courts finding of an oral 
modification, Defendants request that this court find that the 
trial court erred in requiring them to pay accrued interest on the 
contract principal. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 19 95 
_/a L. Mill( 
Attorney for Defendants 
11 
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